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BROADENING ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE COMMODITIES
EXCHANGE ACT
Benjamin D. Pearce*
INTRODUCTION
Futures trading can result in both large gains on a relatively
small investment as well as similarly large losses on the same
investment.1 The Commodities Exchange Act2 (the “CEA” or the
“Act”) was enacted to regulate the futures markets. 3 The CEA
provides for a private right of action against brokers, exchanges and
related organizations that have manipulated the commodities
futures markets in violation of the Act.4 The extent of actual
damages under the Act, however, remains uncertain.5
Although the CEA, as originally enacted, was silent about
private rights of action,6 many courts found them to be implied.7 In
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2008; B.A. in Economics, Colby
College, 2003.
1
NAT ’ L FUTURES ASS’ N , OPPORTUNITY AND R ISK: AN EDUCATIONAL
GUIDE TO TRADING FUTURES AND OPTIONS ON FUTURES 5 (2006).
2
Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27(f) (2007).
3
The CEA was enacted as “a comprehensive regulatory structure to oversee
the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex.” H.R. REP. NO. 93-975, at 1
(1974).
4
7 U.S.C. § 25(b).
5
In re Cannon, 230 B.R. 546, 594 (W.D. Tenn. 1999), rev’d on other
grounds; Stevenson v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22634
(W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2000); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53, 58
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 676 F. Supp.
486, 494–95 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
6
Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 622 F.2d 216, 230
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1982, the Supreme Court held that purchasers of futures contracts
that were subject to improper manipulation in violation of the CEA
could maintain a private right of action against dealers, brokers and
exchanges.8 Within a year, Congress ratified this holding by
enacting Section 22 of the CEA, which provided for an explicit
private right of action and recovery of “actual damages” for
victorious plaintiffs.9
Notwithstanding that private right of action, what “actual
damages” are within the context of futures trading manipulation and
the CEA remains unclear.10 Actual damages is a common legal
remedy that has been construed narrowly in some areas of law11
and broadly in others. 12 Generally, actual damages are considered
synonymous with compensatory damages.13 The Supreme Court,
in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,14 found actual damages to
(6th Cir. 1980).
7
Id.
8
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394
(1982).
9
7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1).
10
Cannon, 230 B.R. at 594.
11
See Mack v. Johnson, 430 F. Supp. 1139, 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(defining actual damages in a civil rights suit as “including out-of-pocket, or
pecuniary losses, as well as compensation for physical and mental suffering”);
Wilson v. Prasse, 325 F. Supp. 9, 15 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (defining actual
damages in another civil rights suit as “expenses for which plaintiff was out of
pocket for food purchased from the commissary and also for humiliation,
embarrassment and mental suffering”).
12
See United States v. State Road Dept. of Fla., 189 F.2d 591, 596 (5th
Cir. 1951) (finding, in a situation where a bridge was damaged by boats in a
storm, that the requirement of the statute of “actual damages to the highway by
reason of his wrongful act” included more than “the cost of repairing and
restoring;” it included consequential damages as well); On Davis v. The Gap,
Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (proposing that in copyright law a broad
construction of actual damages is appropriate).
13
BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY 170 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 2nd pocket ed.
2001). Compensatory damages are “damages, measured by the harm suffered,
awarded to the injured person as due compensation.” Dictionary.com,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/compensatory damages (last visited Sept.
28, 2007).
14
406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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be “the difference between the fair value of all that the [plaintiff]
received and the fair value of what he would have received had
there been no fraudulent conduct.”15
This definition of actual damages is problematic because it
provides little incentive for individuals with a small economic
injury to pursue private rights of action, and as a result, this limited
incentive to private litigants renders the private right of action less
effective as a device to bring miscreants to justice for their
manipulations. This problem manifests itself in situations where,
because of the nature of the futures markets, a manipulator realizes
and retains a significant windfall without a mechanism for
disgorgement.16 Such a result can occur because particular investors
may not bring suit;17 these investors either do not know they have
been defrauded or the high cost of litigation would not justify the
damages they could be awarded if they initiated proceedings. In
such cases, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”) may bring suit in district court against the manipulator
on behalf of the market participants.18 However, if the CFTC fails
to bring suit, a market manipulator may retain a significant portion
of prior gains. Further, if damages are restricted to a measurement

15

Id. at 155; see also Strobl v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 582 F. Supp. 770,
779 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
16
E.g., Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Heffernan, 274 F.
Supp. 2d 1375, 1377 n.1 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (no particular investor was victimized
but the defendant managed to defraud his way into $275,000). The private right
of action under the CEA does not provide a mechanism for disgorgement. 7
U.S.C. § 25(b) (2007).
17
7 U.S.C. § 25(b) (2007).
18
An example can be seen in Heffernan, where the CFTC brought an
action against Heffernan for CEA violations without alleging victimization of
any particular investor. Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 n.1. There the court
used its broad equitable powers to issue a remedy of disgorgement. Id. See also
Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978). Thus, the
Heffernan case illustrates that when a particular investor suffers injury because of
some form of market misconduct and files suit, the defrauding party could have
profited more than any one particular investor lost. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13a-1 (1999);
Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 n.1. See also Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d
30 (1st Cir. 2003); Estate of Pidcock v. Sunnyland America, 726 F. Supp. 1322
(S.D. Ga. 1989).
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of the loss the plaintiff suffered, but the defendant’s profit from
the fraudulent transaction is greater than that loss, the defendant
will still benefit from the fraudulent conduct despite the judgment
against him.19
This perverse result leads to a more disturbing policy concern:
the CEA, which was designed to deter manipulative practices in the
futures markets, could be used to protect defendants from, rather
than subject defendants to, significant liability, provided potential
plaintiff loss levels are kept below potential defendant profit
margins.20 To prevent this contradictory result, and to enhance the
deterrent and remedial effect of the private right of action, actual
damages within the meaning of the CEA should be clarified to reach
beyond strict compensatory damages.
This Note interprets the meaning of actual damages in the
context of the CEA. Part I briefly reviews the general meaning of
actual damages. Part II summarizes the history and functions of the
CEA and the commodity futures markets. Part III presents
arguments in favor of a flexible interpretation of actual damages
based on the legislative history of the Act, the nature of futures
markets, the similarities between commodities and securities law
that suggest similar interpretations of the term are appropriate, the
interpretation of actual damages in the context of the similarly
worded Securities Exchange Act (“SEA”) and a look at other areas
of law that have used actual damages as a measure of recovery and
have addressed similar policy concerns to those presented in this
Note. Part IV proposes two solutions, both of which require a
flexible interpretation of actual damages, to the situation posed in

19

See, e.g., Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 n.1; Commodities
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1978); Lawton v.
Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d 428, 440–44 (D.R.I. 2005); City of San Jose v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8318 (N.D. Cal.
June 6, 1991); Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211
(7th Cir. 1979); Pidcock, 726 F. Supp. at 1334–38.
20
See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986) (using similar
reasoning to reach the same conclusion in the securities context with regards to
the interpretation of actual damages in § 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act;
there limiting the plaintiff’s recovery to actual damages would have allowed the
defendant to retain money obtained through illegal conduct).
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this Note where a defendant stands to profit from his fraudulent
conduct. Finally, Part V concludes that a more flexible
interpretation of actual damages is appropriate.
I.

ACTUAL D AMAGES G ENERALLY

For private recovery under the Act, a plaintiff must prove that
the defendant’s fraudulent conduct was one of four types of
transactions covered by the statute and that the injury was caused
by at least one of those transactions.21 This was illustrated in Ping
He v. NonFerrous Metals Inc.,22 where the plaintiff’s otherwise
valid CEA claims were dismissed because he failed to prove that
the defendant’s conduct caused him to suffer “actual damages.”23
21

7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) provides as follows:
[a]ny person . . . violates this chapter or who willfully aids, abets,
counsels, induces, or procures the commission of a violation of this
chapter shall be liable for actual damages resulting from one or more of
the transactions referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of this
paragraph and caused by such violation to any person(A) who received trading advice from such person for a fee;
(B) who made through such person any contract of sale of any
commodity for future delivery (or option on such contract or any
commodity); or who deposited with or paid to such person money,
securities, or property . . . in connection with any order to make such
contract;
(C) who purchased from or sold to such person or placed through such
person an order for the purchase or sale of(i) an option subject to section 6c of this title . . . ;
(ii) a contract subject to section 23 of this title; or
(iii) an interest or participation in a commodity pool; or
(D) who purchased or sold a contract referred to in subparagraph (B)
hereof if the violation constitutes a manipulation of the price of any
such contract or the price of the commodity underlying such contract.
22

22 F. Supp. 2d 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 108. The Court dismissed a valid § 4b claim that NonFerrous
Metals was an unregistered Futures Commodities Manager (“FCM”) because
Ping He failed to prove that investing with an unregistered FCM resulted in his
alleged injury. Id.
23
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The court wrote, “there is no legal justification for permitting
private litigants to recover damages unless they can show that they
were personally harmed by the defendant’s violation, in the
amount of damages sought.”24
Even if a plaintiff proves that an alleged violation directly
resulted in the injury, the components and extent of those damages
must still be identified. Black’s Law Dictionary defines actual
damages as “[a]n amount awarded to a complainant to compensate
for a proven injury or loss; damages that repay actual losses.”25 In
most cases, actual damages will be interpreted to mean
compensatory damages,26 out-of-pocket loss or some variation on
those concepts; nonetheless, actual damages can, and have been
construed differently.27 For instance, some courts have found that
actual damages can include emotional and mental distress, 28
although others have declined to hold the same.29
Even today, the meaning of actual damages is unclear.30 The
Supreme Court in Randall v. Loftsgaarden,31 tempered its holding
24
25

Id.
BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY 170 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 2nd pocket ed.

2001).
26

See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Clay, 194 F.2d 888 (D.C.
Cir. 1952); United States v. State Road Dept. of Fla., 189 F.2d 591 (5th Cir.
1951); see also BLACK ’S LAW D ICTIONARY 170 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 2nd
pocket ed. 2001).
27
See In re Der, 113 B.R. 218, 231 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989) (citing Randall
v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 662 (1986)) (supporting a “rescissory” measure
of recovery); see also Siebel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1984);
Lawton v. Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d 428, 442 (D.R.I. 2005).
28
See, e.g., Wilson v. Prasse, 325 F. Supp. 9, 15 (W.D. Pa. 1971)
(characterizing actual damages as “out of pocket” loss that included monetary
loss and compensation for “humiliation, embarrassment and mental suffering.”);
see also Mack v. Johnson, 430 F. Supp. 1139, 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(distinguishing actual damages from nominal, punitive or exemplary damages);
see generally Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265 (1st Cir.
1999); Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 447 F. Supp.
543 (D. Colo. 1977).
29
See Emmons v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 532 F.
Supp. 480, 485 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
30
In re Cannon, 230 B.R. 546, 594 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
31
478 U.S. 647 (1986).
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in Affiliated Ute Citizens,32 finding that the measure for actual
damages “ordinarily . . . ‘is the difference between the fair value of
all that the [plaintiff] received and the fair value of what he would
have received had there been no fraudulent conduct.’”33 The
Court’s use of the term ‘ordinarily’ implies that in certain
situations a different meaning of actual damages will be
appropriate. Some courts have used the traditional interpretation of
actual damages based on the facts, despite acknowledging the
Loftsgaarden rationale,34 while other courts have employed a more
expansive approach.35
Given the various circumstances under which courts have been
willing to expand the meaning of actual damages beyond that found
in Black’s Law Dictionary, it may be wise to incorporate the
Loftsgaarden rationale by applying a fact specific approach to
interpreting the actual damages language in the CEA.
II. T HE COMMODITIES EXCHANGES AND THE HISTORY OF
REGULATION
The public generally has little knowledge of the workings and
behaviors of commodity futures. That “lack of comprehension,”
combined with significant growth of the markets over time, has
worked “to hamper effective regulation and create an atmosphere
ripe for fraud.”36 In order to understand how actual damages should
be interpreted in light of the CEA, it is helpful to examine the
history of the commodity futures markets, as well as the reasoning

32

Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)
(holding actual damages to be “the difference between the fair value of all that
the [plaintiff] received and the fair value of what he would have received had there
been no fraudulent conduct.”).
33
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 662 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406
U.S. at 155).
34
Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Minpeco
v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 486, 494–95 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
35
Cannon, 230 B.R. at 594–95 (awarding gross trading losses rather than
the standard net economic loss based on the Loftsgaarden rationale).
36
S. R EP. N O. 97-495, at 1 (1982).
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and goals behind their regulation.
A commodity 37 futures contract is a type of forward contract
in which parties agree to buy or sell a specific quantity and quality
of goods at a specified future date.38 There are two types of futures
contracts: long and short. 39 “The person who has sold a futures
contract, i.e., someone committed to deliver the commodity in the
future, is said to be in a ‘short’ position. Conversely, someone
committed to accept delivery is ‘long.’”40
Consequently, for those investors not interested in the actual
commodities, their number of short contracts must equal their long
contracts. 41 After discussing this nature of the commodity trading
37

Within the meaning of the CEA, a commodity has grown over time to
encompass a wider array of goods. Early on, few goods were traded as
commodities, mainly agricultural products such as “eggs, butter vegetables and
grain.” S. REP. N O. 97-495, at 1. Later, as the markets grew, other agricultural
products, such as cotton, began being traded on exchanges, mainly Chicago and
New York. Id. at 2–3. The 1968 amendments to the CEA added “livestock,
livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice” to the list of traded
commodities. Id. at 3. Up until the 1972 amendments trading was mainly in
physical commodities such as “agricultural products and commercial metals.”
H.R. REP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5 (1982). The Maine Potato was the commodity at
issue in the Curran case. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353, 355 (1982). Silver was the commodity at issue in another case. Strax
v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
However, as the markets grew over time, the coverage of the CEA grew
beyond physical commodities, securities and other financial instruments began
being traded as futures. H.R. REP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5. In the late 1970s, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission approved other financial instruments
such as stock index futures and leverage contracts for trade. S. REP. NO . 97-495,
at 49. The 1974 amendments expanded CEA coverage to include “all . . .
goods and articles . . . and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts
for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.” Curran, 456 U.S. at
366 n.29.
38
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1980).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
“Money is made or lost in the price different [sic] between the original
contract and the offsetting transaction.” Id. Because of this nature of the futures
markets, “[a] person seeking to liquidate his futures position must form an
opposite contract for the same quantity, so that his obligations under the two
contracts will offset each other.” Id.
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market, Judge Henry Friendly of the United States Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit observed that “[f]utures trading is a zerosum game. Since money is made from the change in futures contract
prices, and every contract has a long and a short, 42 every gain can
be matched with a corresponding loss.”43
Generally, there are two types of investors that participate in
the futures markets; the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) classified them as “hedgers” and “speculators.”44 Hedgers
are usually dealers of the actual commodities who seek to lessen
the risk associated with price movements whereas speculators seek
to profit from the same price movements.45
Most buyers and sellers are speculators and do not deal in the
actual commodities involved in the futures contracts. 46 Instead,
these speculators try to profit from price fluctuations by
liquidating their contracts prior to the date specified for the
delivery of the commodity. 47 Speculators make or lose money
based on the price difference between their long and short

42

Id.
Leist, 638 F.2d 286–87.
44
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION , REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS IN RESPONSE TO SECTION 21 OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT,
96th Congress, 2d session ch. II, at 6 (1981).
Typically, a hedger is engaged in the production, distribution,
processing or consumption of the actual commodity or its byproducts.
In a representative situation, the hedger holding an inventory of the
physical commodity may establish an offsetting short position in the
corresponding futures markets. In contrast, the speculator does not
endeavor to reduce the price risk of a cash market position but rather to
profit by anticipating the price movement of a commodity in which a
futures position has been established. In effect, the speculator assumes
the risk of price movements that the hedger seeks to avoid.
43

Id.
45

Id.
Id. See also NAT ’ L FUTURES ASS’ N, OPPORTUNITY AND R ISK: AN
EDUCATIONAL G UIDE TO TRADING FUTURES AND OPTIONS ON FUTURES 4
(2006).
47
Leist, 638 F.2d at 286. Speculators, essentially, bet that prices of a
particular commodity will either rise or fall and they make money by guessing
correctly. Id.
46
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contracts. 48
In the early days of the futures markets, this speculative
activity of buying and selling futures contracts with no intention of
dealing in the goods was viewed as a form of legalized gambling.49
Despite that stigma, speculators play an essential role in the
market because they absorb risk from hedgers50 and create more
trading volume and liquidity in the market, enabling hedgers and
other investors to trade in large contracts. 51
Hedgers also play an important role in the futures markets.
Hedgers transfer their business risks to speculators by engaging in
either short or long contracts to offset the contracts they have
already made in connection with their businesses, thereby
mitigating the effects of price fluctuations in their particular
commodity. 52 For example, if a hedger is a corn farmer, in order to
protect against falling prices in the corn market and thus declining
value of his corn, he will buy offsetting futures contracts for corn,
48

Id.
Michael S. Sackheim, Parameters of Express Private Rights of Action
for Violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, 28 ST . LOUIS U. L.J. 51, 54
(1984).
50
Leist, 638 F.2d at 287. “A ‘hedger’ is a trader with an interest in the
cash market for the commodity, who deals in futures contracts as a means of
transferring risks he faces in the cash market.” Id.
51
H.R. REP. NO . 93-975, at 138 (1974); see also David T. Johnston,
Understanding the Dynamics of Commodity Trading: A Success Story, 35 BUS.
LAW 705, 709 (1980) (“As a general rule, for a market to be broad enough to be
efficient and to accommodate the extremely large orders that come in from time
to time from dealers and commercial firms, 50 to 75 percent of the open interest
and volume of trading must come from speculators—this is essential for there to
be a viable market.”).
52
Leist, 638 F.2d at 287–88. Judge Friendly summed up this principle
nicely:
The owner of a commodity can hedge against declining prices
by entering into equivalent short futures contracts for the month when
he expects to be able to sell, and a processor (e. g., a miller) can hedge
against increasing prices by going long for the month when he will
need the commodity. Losses caused by a decline in prices on the cash
market in the former case or an advance in the latter will be offset by
profits in the futures transactions.
49

Id.
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essentially betting that the price of corn will fall. As a result, if the
price of corn falls, he will lose money on his crop but his futures
investment will make money, thus minimizing the effects of the
price fluctuation.53
Consumers benefit as well from the hedging function of the
markets because by mitigating the risk of price fluctuations and
thus the risk of doing business, a merchant can more safely operate
his business on a lower profit margin without fear of business
failure due to a drop in the price of his commodity. 54 As a result,
he can charge lower prices to distributors who in turn can charge
lower prices to consumers.55
Regulation of the futures markets has long been the subject of
legislative debate.56 The original Commodities Exchange Act was
enacted in 1936.57 The Act built upon previous regulatory
legislation58 by expanding its coverage to more commodities59 and
attempt[ing] to curb excessive speculation by the large market
operator.”60 The goal of enacting the CEA was “to insure fair
practice and honest dealing on the commodity exchanges and to
provide a measure of control over those forms of speculative
activity which too often demoralize the markets to the injury of
53

However, the converse also must be true; if the price of corn rises, the
hedger’s crop will increase in value but he will simultaneously lose money on
his futures investment.
54
H.R. R EP. N O. 93-975, at 132–33.
55
Id.
56
See Sackheim, supra note 49, at 51–63.
57
Commodities Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982)).
58
See Leist, 638 F.2d at 293. The Futures Trading Act of 1921 and The
Grain Futures Act of 1922 were predecessors to the CEA, the first of which was
declared unconstitutional. The former as an impermissible use of the taxing
power in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) and the latter was a valid use of
the commerce power decided in Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
Leist, 638 F.2d at 293.
59
Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining
the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. R EV . 345, 353 (1987).
60
S. REP. NO . 97-495, at 3 (1982). The act accomplished this by
“authoriz[ing] the prosecution of price manipulation as a criminal offense” and
“extend[ing] to the previously uncovered field of commodity brokerage.” Id.
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producers and consumers and the exchanges themselves.”61
The CEA was amended to increase the level of regulation62 in
196863 and again in 1974.64 During the time between the 1968
amendments and the 1974 amendments, the economy changed so
that the futures markets started having a greater effect on the prices
of commodities.65 Fraud was on the rise mainly because of the lack
of regulation and the emergence of new financial futures
instruments that were not covered by the CEA.66 The 1974
Amendments created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”) to provide further regulation to the industry and solve
the concerns that had arisen since the 1968 amendments. 67 This
organization was modeled after the Securities Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) and was deemed necessary to bridge the
“regulatory gap” that existed in the area of commodity futures
trading.68
In 1982, the CEA was amended once again to expressly reflect
the recognition of a private right of action under the Act. 69 The
61

H.R. R EP. N O. 74-421, at 1 (1935).
S. R EP. N O. 97-495, at 3 ( “Futures Commission Merchants (FCM) were
required to meet specific minimum financial standards, penalties were increased
for certain violations, and the issuance of cease and desist orders was authorized.
These amendments required contract markets to enforce their trading rules and
contract terms . . . .”).
63
Id.
64
88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982)).
65
S. REP. NO . 97-495, at 3. The government used to mitigate price
fluctuations in actual consumer goods by holding stockpiles of goods and
releasing them at times when prices rose rapidly, thus creating more supply,
which, in turn, kept prices down. The government stockpiles soon ran out and
the fluctuations in the prices in the commodity futures markets began to have a
greater effect on consumer commodity prices and the producers themselves. Id. at
3–4.
66
Id. For a detailed discussion of leverage transactions and fraudulent
“Boiler Room” scandals, see S. R EP. N O. 97-495, at 4–16.
67
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 295–96 (2d Cir. 1980) (further noting
that the provisions for fraud and trading limits that came from the 1968
Amendments were largely unchanged); see also Sackheim, supra note 49, at
58–60.
68
Sackheim, supra note 49, at 59 n.49.
69
7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (2000).
62
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Supreme Court acknowledged this right in its decision in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran. 70 The Senate concluded
that a private right of action was necessary for efficient resolution
of claims under the CEA to avoid a “proceeding in the Reparations
Section of the CFTC.”71 Before the Curran decision, a plaintiff
seeking recompense for a loss would have to go through the
CFTC—“a process which is often erratic, overburdened and rarely
effective.”72
One commentator has remarked that “[t]he passage of the 1982
Act represented what has been referred to as a ‘comprehensive’
legislative overhauling of the federal regulatory scheme for the
futures industry and related industries.”73 Each amendment to the
CEA has increased regulatory power over the futures markets,
increased the breadth and force of penalties and brought more
commodities under the purview of the Act. 74 Thus, the
interpretation of actual damages under the CEA “must be
considered against this background of increasingly strong regulation
designed to insure the existence of fair and orderly markets.”75
III. A BROAD D EFINITION OF ACTUAL D AMAGES U NDER THE
CEA SHOULD BE A DOPTED IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
Actual damages should be defined broadly enough that the
threat of liability would work to prevent inequity and to further
the purposes of the CEA. In most situations, actual damages
should continue to be restricted to out-of-pocket loss. However, in
other situations, particularly where a defendant stands to profit
from his fraudulent and manipulative conduct, courts should be
able and willing to apply remedies of disgorgement or rescission.
This section provides arguments to support this formulation.

70

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394
(1982) (recognizing an implied private right of action under the CEA).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Sackheim, supra note 49, at 63 (citations omitted).
74
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 296 (2d Cir. 1980).
75
Id.
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Part A highlights support in the legislative history of the CEA.
Part B shows that the growing and changing nature of commodity
futures markets necessitates a greater measure of deterrence to
manipulators and that a flexible interpretation of actual damages
can accomplish that goal. Part C demonstrates that, in light of the
growing similarities between commodities and securities trading,
the CEA provisions for damages should be interpreted similarly to
the analogous provisions under the SEA. Part D shows that the
principle enunciated in Loftsgaarden—that it is better for victims
of misconduct to benefit rather than the perpetrators and similarly,
allowing the perpetrators to benefit from their misconduct would
only encourage more misconduct—is neither novel nor unique to
securities law and should be applied to the commodities realm.
Finally, Part E addresses why a flexible measure of damages is
appropriate in light of the CFTC’s ability to compel manipulators
to disgorge their ill-gotten profits. 76
A. Legislative Support for a Flexible Interpretation of Actual
Damages
An examination of the legislative history of the often-amended
CEA supports the propositions that actual damages should not be
strictly interpreted and that in certain situations flexibility in
damage awards is appropriate.77
Reckless speculation and manipulative trading practices led to
the need for congressional regulation.78 Congress recognized the
importance of the hedgers and speculators and has endeavored to
preserve their functions through their scheme of regulation.79
76

See Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Heffernan, 274 F. Supp.
2d 1375 (S.D. Ga. 2003); Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Muller,
570 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1978).
77
See generally S. REP. NO . 97-495 (1982); H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 2
(1982); H.R. REP. NO . 74-421 (1934); H.R. REP. N O. 93-975 (1974); H.R.
CONF. R EP. N O. 97-964 (1982).
78
S. R EP. N O. 97-495, at 2.
79
The CFTC was given the “responsibility of ensuring that the futures
markets fulfill their historic functions of providing opportunities for hedging
against future price fluctuations in commodities and mechanisms for locking in
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Congress was compelled to walk a thin line between deterring
excessive speculation and keeping a significant volume of
speculators involved in the market. 80
Thus, throughout the legislative history of the CEA, two
competing interests have influenced Congressional decision-making:
(1) providing for a fair and safe market place by deterring
manipulation and fraudulent behavior,81 and (2) preserving the
hedging function of the markets that was deemed essential for the
protection of the actual producers and buyers of commodities. 82
The proper interpretation of actual damages within the context of
the CEA should seek to satisfy these two competing interests.
1.

A History of Deterrence

Deterrence of manipulative activities has always been a driving
force behind efforts at regulation since the 1800’s when
“[s]peculative excesses, irresponsible trading and lack of effective
market regulation eventually stirred farm resentment and led to a
movement . . . to abolish futures trading.”83 As markets grew and
began to encompass more commodities,84 the need for deterrence
grew as well.85 Congress responded by consistently amending the
Act.86 Through its amendments, Congress has steadily increased
the breadth of statutory coverage, strengthened the powers of

commodity prices at future dates.” H.R. R EP. N O. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5.
80
The goals of enacting the CEA were “to insure fair practice and honest
dealing on the commodity exchanges and to provide a measure of control over
those forms of speculative activity which too often demoralize the markets to the
injury of producers and consumers and the exchanges themselves.” H.R. REP.
NO. 74-421, at 1.
81
S. REP. NO. 97-495, at 2; Donald Campbell, Trading in Futures Under
the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 GEO. W ASH . L. REV . 215, 223 (1958); see
also H.R. R EP. N O. 74-421, at 1, supra note 80 and accompanying text.
82
H.R. REP. N O . 97-565, pt. 2, at 5.
83
S. R EP. N O. 97-495, at 2.
84
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 295–96 (2d Cir. 1980).
85
Id.; S. R EP. N O. 97-495, at 1–4.
86
Leist, 638 F.2d at 296.
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regulation and heightened the penalties pursuant to the Act.87 The
trend of increased and strengthened regulation suggests that the goal
of deterring manipulative behavior was becoming more important.
Congress’s decisions over time to increase penalties under the
CEA mirrored the perceived need for deterrence. While punitive
damages are not provided for under either the CEA88 or federal
securities anti-fraud laws,89 the CEA does provide for criminal
sanctions.90 In 1936, provisions91 for criminal offenses were
extended to cover the newly enacted provisions of the amendment
as well as market and price manipulation.92 These were essentially
limited to misdemeanors resulting in fines and imprisonment. 93
These limitations did not persist. 94 In the 1968 Amendments,
Congress elevated criminal price manipulation to a felony offense
and increased the corresponding maximum prison sentence fivefold.95 Just six years later, Congress increased the maximum fine
associated with the penalty provisions ten-fold.96 Section 13(a) of
the CEA provides for accomplice liability so that willfully or
knowingly aiding in a violation of the CEA may subject a person to

87

Id.
See 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2000).
89
See Sackheim, supra note 49, at 80 n.185.
90
S. REP. N O. 97-495, at 3 (“The [1936] amendments authorized the
prosecution of price manipulation as a criminal offense.”).
91
See Leist, 638 F.2d at 293–94. Similar provisions, invoking similar
penalties, were encompassed in the CEA predecessorsThe Futures Trading
Act of 1921 and The Grain Futures Act of 1922. Id.
92
Id. at 295.
93
Id. at 293–94 (the penalties were essentially a carry over from the original
Futures Trading Act and provided for “a fine of up to $10,000 and/or
imprisonment for up to one year.”); see also 49 Stat. 1491, 1501 (1936)
(amended by 82 Stat. 26, 33 (1968)).
94
Leist, 638 F.2d at 295.
95
Id. In particular, embezzlement and price manipulation became felony
offenses carrying greater prison sentences than they previously did as
misdemeanors. The maximum sentence went up from one year to five years. 82
Stat. 26, 33–34 (1968).
96
Leist, 638 F.2d at 295 (fines increased from a maximum of $10,000 to
$100,000).
88
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prosecution as a principal.97 This section of the Act substantially
mirrors federal criminal statutes for aiding and abetting.98
Congress’s ascension from misdemeanor penalties to felony
offenses,99 together with the ability to prosecute for willful
conduct of someone who is not a principal,100 has demonstrated a
significant and growing interest in deterrence.
2.

Preserving Hedging

Preservation of the ability of the futures markets to continue to
provide an opportunity for hedging is an equally weighty interest
that must not be undermined by policies aimed at deterring market
and price manipulation.101 Further, the participation of speculators
in the markets is essential to ensure that the hedging function of the
markets is maintained.102 Thus, to serve both Congressional
interests, the legislature must carefully craft policies that deter
manipulation but that do not deter speculation.
3.

A Flexible Interpretation of Actual Damages Accomplishes both
Legislative Goals

Allowing flexibility in the interpretation of actual damages is a
particularly effective method of deterring manipulation while
retaining the participation of speculators in the market. Permitting
courts to either give the defendant’s windfall to a plaintiff or
otherwise strip the defendant of his profits would prevent unjust
enrichment in cases where the defendant stands to benefit from his
wrongdoing. The prospect of the loss of all of the malefactor’s
illegal gain would deter similar manipulative conduct. Therefore, if
potential wrongdoers were contemplating violating one of the CEA

97

7 U.S.C. § 13(c)(a) (1982).
Sackheim, supra note 49, at 87.
99
Leist, 638 F.2d at 295.
100
7 U.S.C. § 13(c)(a) (1982).
101
H.R. R EP. N O. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5–6 (1982).
102
H.R. REP. NO . 93-975, at 138 (1974); see also Johnston, supra note
51, at 709.
98
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provisions, they would have to consider the full extent of the
greater risks associated with being caught.
Furthermore, this approach is consistent with the purposes of
the CEA because it would not have a deterrent effect on
speculators.103 By definition, honest speculators would never be
reached by this penalty because they do not intend to violate the
CEA. In fact, a flexible interpretation of actual damages could
potentially, work to encourage speculative investors to put money
into the markets because it would work to better ensure a fair and
orderly functioning of the markets.
Accordingly, a flexible interpretation of actual damages would
not be contrary to the legislative concerns surrounding the CEA
and would, in all likelihood, further the goal of “insur[ing] fair
practice and honest dealing on the commodity exchanges and
[providing] a measure of control over those forms of speculative
activity which too often demoralize the markets to the injury of
producers and consumers and the exchanges themselves.”104
B. The Nature and Size of the Futures Markets Necessitate a
Flexible Interpretation of Actual Damages
As markets grow and expand their coverage to more diverse
types of futures contracts, 105 they create an “atmosphere ripe for
fraud”106 because investor comprehension may lag behind the
shenanigans practiced by dishonest market predators.107 As one
court put it, “[t]he methods and techniques of manipulation are

103

The purposes of the CEA are: (1) providing for a fair and safe market
place by deterring manipulation and fraudulent behavior and (2) preserving the
hedging function of the markets that was deemed essential for the protection of
the actual producers and buyers of commodities. See S. REP. NO. 97-495 at 2
(1982); Campbell, supra note 81, at 223; H.R. R EP. N O. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5–6.
104
Campbell, supra note 81, at 223.
105
S. R EP. N O. 97-495, at 1–4.
106
In the words of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, “[t]his
lack of comprehension has tended to hamper effective regulation and create an
atmosphere ripe for fraud.” Id. at 1.
107
Id.
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limited only by the ingenuity of man.”108
If every gain, regardless of whether it was ill gotten, attaches to
a corresponding loss, it necessarily follows that, in situations
where a manipulator’s gains exceed the plaintiff’s loss, the
manipulator will improperly receive the money of another investor
who likely does not realize that he has suffered a loss as a result of
the manipulator’s conduct. 109 In short, the violator of the CEA
would conceivably be allowed to keep money earned from his
manipulative conduct that should rightfully be returned to another
investor or many other investors who may not even realize that
they have been defrauded.
This idea is reinforced by the fact that futures markets have
been characterized as “the country’s largest gambling dens,”110 and
that they often appeal to those with gambling dispositions. 111
Accordingly, one might postulate that speculators who are
investing with this mindset are expecting to lose money on some or
even most investments. While it is inevitable that many of these
“gambling” investors will lose on some of their investments, these
speculators may not be aware or concerned that any particular loss
came from the illegal conduct of another person.112
Further, their losses would necessarily benefit another market
participant by virtue of the “zero sum” nature of the markets. 113 If
those losses were the result of an illegal market manipulation, and if
at least a portion of every loss ends up in the hands of the
manipulator, it becomes evident how a manipulator of the markets

108

Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971).
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286–87 (2d Cir. 1980). The “zero
sum” language means that for every transaction “every gain can be matched with
a corresponding loss.” Id.
110
Sackheim, supra note 49, at 54.
111
Sackheim, supra note 49, at 54.
112
Such investors may not realize there is anything they can do to recoup
losses because they think that losses are just part of routine market operation or
investors may realize their options but conclude that the loss was so
insignificant that it was is not worth trying to recover their losses in court. In
either event, these investors are not concerned about recovering their losses; they
will not bring actions and the lost funds will not be sought after.
113
Leist, 638 F.2d at 286–87.
109
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could benefit from his wrongdoing. The situation is akin to a thief
taking a small sum of money from everyone he knows in the hope
that none of his victims will realize the theft. Most victims would
not realize that they were missing any money, and even if a victim
were to realize his loss, he may determine that the relatively small
loss is not worth the time and resources needed to recover it.
Nonetheless, the fact that no one objected to the thefts does not
exonerate the thief. Similarly, it seems perverse to let a violator of
the CEA keep money that was, in whole or in part, fraudulently
obtained from an honest market participant. Rather, the
defendant’s ill-gotten profits should be disgorged or rescinded
through a more flexible interpretation of actual damages under the
CEA.
C. The Parallel Language in the SEA and CEA Suggest a
Parallel Interpretation of Actual Damages is Proper
The bodies of law addressed by the SEA and the CEA—
securities law and commodities law, respectively—are closely
related114 and have comparable provisions relating to fraud.115 In
particular, the damages provisions under § 22(c) of the CEA and §
28(a) of the SEA are similarly worded.116 This has led many courts
to use securities law cases, such as Loftsgaarden, to guide them in
interpreting the damages provisions under the CEA.117 Because of
114

Id. at 298 n.14 (drawing an analogy between securities law and
commodities law); see also id. at 301 n.17 (“[T]he cases under the CEA,
numerous and consistent as they are, cannot be taken in isolation but must be
considered along with the vast body of law under the securities statutes which
set the tone during the late ‘40’s, the ‘50’s, the ‘60’s, and the early ‘70’s, and
on which the CEA decisions relied.”).
115
See Sackheim, supra note 49, at 82 (noting similarity between § 4b of
the CEA to antifraud provisions of the SEA, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
116
In an effort to determine the meaning of actual damages under the CEA,
Judge G. Harvey Boswell sitting in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Tennessee, Western Division noted that “[b]ecause CEA §
22(c)tracks [sic] the language of section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 . . . cases dealing with securities fraud provide direction.” In re Cannon,
230 B.R. 546, 594 n.71 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
117
See id. at 594; Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53, 55
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their similarities, the congruence of their purposes, and the overlap
of the two markets, an interpretation of actual damages under the
CEA should be made in light of the decisions interpreting the same
language under the SEA.
The similarities between the SEA and CEA are well recognized
by courts, commentators and legislators.118 Judge Friendly’s
expression of the similarities in purpose and legislative approach to
the laws promulgated under the CEA and SEA is particularly clear:
While there are differences between the commodities and
securities fields, what is relevant to the present question is
the common legislative objective of insuring fair dealing for
investors on what are important public markets, and the
common legislative approach to attaining this objective. The
analogy between the two fields has been repeatedly
recognized by Congress. (citations omitted). The 1936
amendments [to the CEA] arose from an explicit concern to
make protection in the commodities field as strong as it was
in the securities field, lest the unscrupulous would simply
transfer this [sic] operations from one market to another.119
Though the focus of Judge Friendly’s opinion was implied private
rights of action under the CEA,120 the analogy drawn between the
commodities and securities fields is equally applicable to the
interpretation of actual damages—the remedy prescribed by both
the CEA and SEA for the same private rights of action that Judge
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 676 F. Supp.
486, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
118
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,
389 n.88 (1982) (wording of § 4(b) of the CEA and § 10(b) of SEA is similar);
Leist, 638 F.2d at 298 n.14 (“The analogy between the two [commodities and
securities] fields has been repeatedly recognized by congress.”) (citations
omitted); Cannon, 230 B.R. at 594 n.71 (recognizing analogous wording in
damages provisions of the SEA and CEA); H.R. REP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 6–7
(1982) (noting the jurisdictional overlaps between the SEC and CFTC);
Sackheim, supra note 49, at 82 (noting similarity between § 4b of CEA to
antifraud provisions of the SEA, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; also noting same
standard of proof applied in SEC and CFTC administrative enforcement
proceedings).
119
Leist, 638 F.2d at 298 n.14 (citations omitted).
120
Id. at 285.
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Friendly discussed in Leist.121
Judge Friendly’s analogy, based on legislative findings,122 is
reinforced by the fact that developments in commodities law have
often paralleled earlier developments in securities law.123 Examples
include the recognition of a private right of action124 under the
respective legislations and the development of similar regulatory
commissions. 125
After the enactment of the CEA, futures trading evolved to
encompass more than just agricultural commodities and natural
resources and began to include trading of financial instruments and
indices of corporate securities.126 Naturally, the reach of the SEA
and the CEA, and the scope of their respective regulatory
commissions, the SEC and the CFTC, began to overlap. 127
Congress, in the House Reports accompanying the 1982
amendments to the CEA, recognized this overlap and tellingly
suggested a similar policy approach with regards to the respective
regulatory bodies under the CEA and SEA: “If the CFTC is to
regulate whole new types of contracts, contracts which will include
securities now the responsibility of the SEC, thus drawing the two
markets closer together, prudent public policy dictates that the
rules governing the trading and marketing of their respective

121

Specifically, § 22(c) of the CEA and § 28(a) of the SEA contain the
actual damages language for private rights of action under the respective Acts.
Cannon, 230 B.R. at 594 n.71.
122
Leist, 638 F.2d at 298 n.14.
123
See Curran, 456 U.S. at 379 (“The routine recognition of a private
remedy under the CEA prior to our decision in Cort v. Ash was comparable to
the routine acceptance of an analogous remedy under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.”); Sackheim, supra note 49, at 82 (explaining that the CFTC was
modeled after the SEC).
124
Curran, 456 U.S. at 379.
125
Sackheim, supra note 49, at 82 (noting that the CFTC was modeled
after the SEC).
126
H.R. REP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5 (1982). The original purposes of the CEA
were “providing opportunities for hedging against future price fluctuations in
commodities and mechanisms for locking in commodity prices at future dates.”
Id. at 4.
127
Id. at 5.
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products be harmonized.”128
Such parallelism in regulatory advancements in the SEA and
CEA leads to a common sense conclusion that interpretation of the
actual damages provision in the CEA should also parallel the
interpretation of actual damages in the SEA—an issue that the
Loftsgaarden case addressed.129
1.

Randall v. Loftsgaarden: A Flexible Interpretation of Actual
Damages under the SEA

Randall v. Loftsgaarden, the leading case in support of a
flexible interpretation of actual damages under the SEA, is
persuasive for finding a similar flexible interpretation of the same
language under the CEA.130 The case involved investors who were
fraudulently induced to buy into a real estate tax shelter scheme
that was intended to provide a tax benefit to investors by creating
more deductible expenses.131 The jury found the defendant liable
under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,132 § 10(b) of the
SEA,133 SEC rule 10b-5134 and state law securities claims.135

128

Id. at 13–14.
See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 663 (1986).
130
See In re Cannon, 230 B.R. 546, 593–95 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (using
Loftsgaarden rationale to determine the extent of actual damages under the
CEA); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53, 54–56 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(discussing Loftsgaarden to determine if actual damages required an offset for
plaintiff gains under the CEA); Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 676
F. Supp. 486, 490–95 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (using Loftsgaarden to determine the
extent of actual damages under the CEA).
131
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 650–51.
132
§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 “provides that an investor harmed
by prospectus fraud may sue ‘to recover the consideration paid for such security
with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon
tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.’” Id. at
651–52 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2)).
133
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 389 n.88 (1982) (noting that the wording of § 4(b) of the
CEA and § 10(b) of SEA is similar).
134
17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1985); See Sackheim, supra note 49, at 82
(noting similarity between § 4b of CEA to antifraud provisions of the SEA, §
129
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Because the plaintiffs’ investments were worthless by the time
they brought suit, the trial court ordered a full rescissory remedy
under § 12(2).136
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed and remanded for a new trial.137 It held that both § 12(2)
and § 10(b) needed to comport with the theory of actual damages
permitting a plaintiff to recover no more than the equivalent of the
harm suffered, and as such, the measure of rescission should have
been offset by the amount received in tax benefits stemming from
the investment.138 The court reasoned that the § 10(b) claim was
dependent on § 28(a) of the SEA, which limits recovery to actual
damages.139 The Eighth Circuit noted, in reference to the § 12(2)
claim, that although “the words ‘actual damages’ do not appear in
the 1933 Act, . . . [rescission should be] substantially equivalent to
the damages permitted under section 28(a).”140 In essence, the court
found that although a rescissory remedy, authorized under § 12(2),
would award the plaintiff with more than actual damages, recovery
should be limited to the harm suffered because the defendant was
also found liable under § 10(b), which limits recovery to actual
damages.141
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax benefits
received were not income received and thus should not have offset

10(b) and Rule 10b-5; also noting same standard of proof applied in SEC and
CFTC administrative enforcement proceedings).
135
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 651.
136
15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2007).
137
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 652.
138
Id.
139
§ 28(a) provides that “no person permitted to maintain a suit for
damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction
of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of.” 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a).
140
Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1986). Under the
rescissory approach originally employed by the District Court, plaintiffs would
have been entitled to total recoveries ranging from $64,610 to $96,385. Under
the Court of Appeals’ final ruling, however, plaintiffs could recover only
amounts ranging from $506 to $7,666. Id. at 961.
141
Id. at 954.
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the recovery provided for by the District Court. 142 The Court
agreed with the Court of Appeals that § 28(a) of the SEA strictly
limits recovery to actual damages.143 Nonetheless, it held rescission
to be the appropriate remedy, implying that actual damages in the
context of the SEA are not limited to strict compensatory
damages.144
Loftsgaarden is an important decision for two reasons. First, it
provided a basis for a remedy of rescission for a § 10(b) claim,
despite language within § 28(a) of the SEA limiting recovery to
actual damages.145 Second, in dicta, Loftsgaarden implied that
recovery under the actual damages language of § 28 (a) of the SEA
is flexible and could be greater than a party’s out-of-pocket loss.146
Loftsgaarden demonstrated a logical basis for finding that
rescission is at times an appropriate remedy under the SEA.147 The
Court noted that § 12(2), which provides for a remedy of
rescission, was not amended a year after its enactment when §
28(a), providing for actual damages on § 10(b) claims, was
enacted.148 It reasoned, therefore, that § 28(a) was not intended to
limit the measure of recovery provided for by § 12(2).149 If there is
no mandatory offset for rescission under § 12(2), the same should
be true for § 10(b). Consequently, unless Congress intended to
have inconsistent results for the same remedy, offsetting
limitations to rescission should not be compulsory.150
Aside from having a logical basis, the Court also found circuit

142

Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 658. The theory is that if tax benefits were
income received then they would offset the recovery under a rescissory remedy.
Id.
143
Id. at 660.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 662.
146
Id. at 663–64. The Court found that the tax benefits that the plaintiffs
received were not sufficient to be considered windfalls and the tax code would
serve to reduce any gains that the plaintiffs received as a result of the damages
awarded. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 663–64.
147
Id. at 661.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 662–63.
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court precedent for the rescission remedy under SEA § 28(a).151
The Ninth Circuit stated, in Blackie v. Barrack, that “[w]hile out
of pocket loss is the ordinary standard in a 10b-5 suit, it is within
the discretion of the district judge in appropriate circumstances to
apply a rescissory measure.”152 The Loftsgaarden Court, citing
Blackie v. Barrack with approval, shows that, in certain situations,
a more expansive definition of actual damages may be appropriate.
In fact, the Court in Loftsgaarden went so far as to label
recovery under § 28(a) of the SEA as “flexible.”153 The Court
recognized that one of Congress’s intentions in enacting the SEA
was to deter fraud and manipulative practices in the securities
markets 154 and that strict adherence to the dictionary definition of
actual damages would contradict that salutary purpose.155 Thus,
the Court reasoned that deterrence warranted a flexible
interpretation of actual damages.156 In those situations where the
defendant stands to benefit from his fraudulent behavior because he
received more than the plaintiff lost, “[it] is more appropriate to
give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let
the fraudulent party keep them.”157 A contrary decision would
provide an incentive for fraudulent behavior because it would
protect perpetrators of securities fraud from liability to many of
their victims.158
This circumstance led the Court in Loftsgaarden to find that
“the mere fact that the receipt of . . . benefits, plus a full recovery
under a rescissory measure of damages, may place a § 10(b)
plaintiff in a better position than he would have been in absent the
151

Id. at 662.
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 816 (1976).
153
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 663.
154
S. R EP. N O. 97-495, at 2 (1982).
155
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); see
also Herman v. MacLean, 459 U.S. 375, 386–87 (1983); Sec. Exch. Comm’n
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
156
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 663.
157
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (8th Cir. 1965); see also Falk v.
Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199 (1922) (Cardozo, J.).
158
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 664.
152
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fraud, does not establish that the flexible limits of § 28(a) have been
exceeded.”159 Thus, the Court seemed to believe that, in certain
factual situations, it is not anathematic to the meaning of actual
damages for a plaintiff to be made more than whole.160
2.

Commodities Cases After Loftsgaarden

The principle enunciated in Loftsgaarden—that a fraudulent
party should not be allowed to benefit from his fraud161—has been
recognized in a number of commodities cases.162 However, such
decisions have not always resulted in the plaintiff recovering
159

Id. at 663.
Id. at 666–67. The Court restricted its holding to the facts of the case
and found that in certain situations courts can use their discretion, where
appropriate, to bar a rescission remedy under § 10(b). Id. The Court noted the
potential for abuse; wherein § 12(2) plaintiffs will wait until they get their tax
benefits and then file their claims for rescission, thereby maximizing their return
on the investment that went wrong. Id. The Court thought that other courts
could adequately deal with this potential abuse by barring rescissory recovery in
those circumstances. Id. at 666. Nonetheless, the Court held that in this
circumstance the rescissory recovery under § 12(2) is not required to be offset by
the tax benefits received under the tax shelter investment, despite the fact that it
may make the plaintiff more than whole. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 667.
Some courts before Loftsgaarden ruled out a rescission remedy under §
10(b). See e.g., Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 706 (7th
Cir. 1987), and at least one circuit has continued to bar rescission for such
claims. See Zahorik v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14085, *4 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 1987). However, the majority of federal
circuits have followed Loftsgaarden. See, e.g., Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30,
45–46 (1st Cir. 2003); In re Broderbund/Learning Co. Sec. Litig. v. Mattell,
Inc., 294 F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2002); DCD Programs v. Leighton, 90
F.3d 1442, 1451 (9th Cir. 1996); McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm’t, 65
F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1549,
1553–54 (10th Cir. 1992); Rousseff v. E.F. Hutton Co., 843 F.2d 1326, 1328–
29 (11th Cir. 1988); Lycan v. Walters, 904 F. Supp. 884 (S.D. Ind. 1995);
Prudential-Bache Secur., Inc. v. Cullather, 678 F. Supp. 601, 607 (E.D. Va.
1987).
161
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 663–64.
162
See Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
160
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damages in excess of his out-of-pocket losses. 163 These courts have
recognized that recovery beyond out-of-pocket loss is appropriate
only if limiting recovery would contradict goals of equity or
deterrence.164 It appears from the cases that when policy goals of
equity or deterrence are sufficiently great, a flexible interpretation
of actual damages and thus, a recovery beyond out-of-pocket loss
is appropriate.165
This principle is well illustrated in the commodity arena.166 In
Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc.,167 the defendants
manipulated the silver market in violation of the CEA and the
plaintiff sought out-of-pocket losses and lost profits.168 With
regard to the out-of-pocket losses, the court found that the losses
must be offset by the gain in value of their silver holdings, thus
limiting the recovery to net economic injury.169 Despite so holding,
the court read the Loftsgaarden decision “as supporting the
proposition that there is no rigid requirement that a plaintiff must
always be limited to its net economic injury where such a limitation
would be inequitable or contrary to deterrent goals.”170 The
plaintiffs in Minpeco were limited in recovery to their net economic
loss because they “made no showing that if an offset [was]
imposed [there] defendants [would] be either unjustly enriched or
sheltered from any ‘appreciable liability’ as in Loftsgaarden.”171
Nevertheless, the district court recognized the availability of
broader recovery where appropriate.172
Another commodities case that acknowledged the principle set
forth in Loftsgaarden is Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro.173 In Apex Oil
Co., the claimant actually profited from the fraudulent practices of
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Apex, 744 F. Supp. at 55; Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 489.
Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 489.
See id.; Apex, 744 F. Supp. at 55.
See Apex, 744 F. Supp. at 55; Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 489.
676 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Id. at 487.
Id. at 490.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 489.
744 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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the defendant. 174 The plaintiff wanted the court to give him a
windfall by awarding him the profits gained by the defendant as a
result of the fraudulent conduct,175 and cited Loftsgaarden to
support the idea that such an award would accomplish the
deterrent goals enunciated in the decision.176 The court rejected that
idea because the plaintiff profited from the fraud.177 In so holding,
the court decided that deterrence alone could not justify such a
recovery.178 However, the court did support the reading of
Loftsgaarden in Minpeco that damages can make plaintiffs more
than whole if they are awarded in the interests of equity or
deterrence.179 Therefore, it appears the inequity that would result
from the requested damage award was great enough to overcome
deterrence concerns.
In order to effectively deter fraudulent misconduct in the
securities field, the meaning of actual damages has been construed
broadly, thereby allowing for either rescission or disgorgement. 180
In light of the Congressional findings for the 1982 amendments to
the CEA and the overlapping nature of the securities and
174

Id. at 54. The decision dealt only with the damages to be awarded for
the remaining counterclaims from a related commodities fraud litigation. Id.
175
Id. at 54–55.
176
Id. at 55.
177
Id. at 56.
178
Id.
179
Apex, 744 F. Supp. at 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
180
See Kane v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 916 F.2d 643, 646–47
(11th Cir. 1990) (awarding, in a securities action under state law, where the
award of damages is, by statute, the same as it is under federal law, rescissory
damages and citing the same deterrence principle espoused in Loftsgaarden as
its reasoning); Estate of Pidcock v. Sunnyland America, 726 F. Supp. 1322,
1329 (S.D. Ga. 1989) (“In the case of a defrauded seller in an action brought
under Rule 10b-5, ‘where the defrauding purchaser receives more than the
seller’s actual loss, the damages are the purchaser’s profits.’ . . . Moreover, once
the element of fraud has been established, as it was in this case, ‘any profit
subsequently realized by the defrauding purchaser should be deemed the
proximate consequence of the fraud.’”[citations omitted]); In re Der, 113 B.R.
218, 231 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989) (citing Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647,
662 (1986)) (supporting a “rescissory” measure of recovery); see also Siebel v.
Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1984); Lawton v. Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d
428, 442 (D.R.I. 2005).
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commodities markets,181 this idea should apply to the CEA as well
as the SEA. Accordingly, several courts in the commodities context
have allowed recovery of gross trading losses as a result of
fraudulent misconduct without an offset for profitable trades.182
Other courts have allowed recovery of lost profits to the extent
that evidence permits a jury to extrapolate what the position of the
markets would have been absent the fraud.183
In light of the Minpeco and Apex Oil Co. cases, it is sensible to
apply the rationale employed in Loftsgaarden—conferring a
benefit on the defrauded party rather than permitting the miscreant
to keep the proceeds of his fraud—to the recovery of damages
under the CEA. The application of the Loftsgaarden principle,
however, is not without limitations. The Minpeco and Apex Oil Co.
cases also show that the Court’s reasoning in Loftsgaarden should
be applied with discretion184 and should only have an effect when
“limitation [of recovery] would be inequitable or contrary to
deterrent goals.”185
Loftsgaarden should not be interpreted as requiring recovery
beyond out-of-pocket loss in the context of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
claims under § 28(a) of the SEA. Rather, Loftsgaarden put forth
alternative means of recovery that are appropriate in certain
181

H.R. R EP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 13 (1982).
See generally Kuhland v. Lincolnwood, Inc., No. R 79-493-80-47, 1986
WL 65629 (C.F.T.C. Mar. 14, 1986); Gatens v. Int’l Precious Metals Corp.,
No. R 81-673-05, 1985 WL 55298 (C.F.T.C. June 18, 1985); DeAngelis v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., No. R 80-1278-81-187, 1984 WL 47628
(C.F.T.C. Mar. 14, 1984).
183
See generally Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 676 F. Supp.
486 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Strobl v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 582 F. Supp. 770
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
184
See Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 650 F. Supp. 1091, 1113 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (acknowledging, in a securities law case under § 28(a) of the SEA, the
availability of rescissory or disgorgement damages under the same line of
reasoning as in Loftsgaarden but not awarding either based on the facts of the
case); see also C. C. Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 1955) (“It
would be a perversion of the statute to allow remittances made in conjunction
with a void and unlawful security to be exempt from restitution, and would
permit unjust enrichment under the guise of statutory definition.”).
185
Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 490.
182
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circumstances to accomplish the policy goals expressed in the
SEA.186 Many cases, such as Minpeco and Apex Oil Co., still award
actual damages according to the traditional, strict interpretation of
actual damages, notwithstanding the decision in Loftsgaarden.187 In
many cases, especially those where a defendant does not stand to
benefit from the fraud by virtue of the penalty imposed or where
deterrence and equity goals would not be served by a recovery
beyond out-of-pocket loss, the strict interpretation of actual
damages is appropriate. Therefore, a more widespread application
of flexible actual damages in this area is likely to be reserved for the
most egregious and inequitable situations.
3.

Securities Law Should be a Guide to Interpreting Actual
Damages Under the CEA

Given the similar wording of § 22(c) of the CEA and § 28(a) of
the SEA,188 the similarities in purpose and legislative approach of
the two Acts 189 and the growing overlap of markets, 190 the
interpretation of actual damages in the CEA should be consistent
with the interpretation of the same language in the SEA. Using the
SEA as a guidepost to determining damages under the CEA is a
sensible method that has already been adopted by courts.191 In
particular, courts have used the decision in Loftsgaarden to infer
that actual damages can provide for “different measures of
186

Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 662 (1986) (citing Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975)).
187
See Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 490; Rowe, 650 F. Supp. at 1113; Apex
Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 744 F. Supp. 53, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Pelletier
v. Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1989) (deciding in a Rule
10b-5 case, despite citing precedent for rescissory remedies, the appropriate
measure of damages to be strict actual damages and awards nothing for failure to
prove any out-of-pocket loss).
188
In re Cannon, 230 B.R. 546, 594 n.71 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
189
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 298 n.14 (2d Cir. 1980).
190
H.R. R EP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5 (1982).
191
Cannon, 230 B.R. at 594 (reading from Loftsgaarden, that strictly
adhering to a narrow definition of actual damages that limits plaintiffs to their
net economic loss, works contrary to the deterrent purpose of the Act); see also
Apex, 744 F. Supp. at 55; Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 490.
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recovery” beyond net economic loss, “including rescission and
restitution.”192 Some courts have used the Loftsgaarden decision to
analyze how damages for a CEA violation could be awarded but
have not gone so far as to award damages beyond the standard net
economic loss.193 Still, there is a growing recognition among judges
that actual damages in CEA cases may be measured in ways that
exceed mere net economic loss.194 The decision in In Re Cannon
shows that where “true compensatory damages are not accurately
represented by [] ‘net economic loss,’ but rather, by . . . the gross
losses in [an] account,” an expanded interpretation of the actual
damages provision of the CEA would be appropriate.195
D. Other Areas of Law Support the Same Principle that Calls
for a Flexible Interpretation of Actual Damages
The rationale that allowed the Loftsgaarden Court to award
rescissory damages despite a statutory limitation to actual damages
is neither unique to that case nor to securities law.196 For example,
copyright law provides for actual damages, including the infringer’s
profits or, in the alternative, statutory damages.197 “Courts and
192

See Cannon, 230 B.R. at 594.
Apex, 744 F. Supp. at 58; Minpeco, 676 F. Supp. at 494–95.
194
Cannon, 230 B.R. at 595.
195
Id.
196
Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 663 (1986). See also On Davis
v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (invoking a similar
principle of construction to favor victims of copyright infringement over
infringers); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965) (“[It] is more
appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let
the fraudulent party keep them.”); see generally Falk v. Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199
(1922) (Cardozo, J.).
197
17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (2004). § 504 provides:
(a) In general. Except as otherwise provided by this title, an infringer of
copyright is liable for either193

(1) the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of
the infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or
(2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c).
(b) Actual damages and profits. The copyright owner is entitled to
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commentators agree [that actual damages] should be broadly
construed to favor victims of [copyright] infringement.”198 In On
Davis v. The Gap, 199 the Second Circuit used reasoning similar to
that used by the Supreme Court in Loftsgaarden to find that
licensing fees should be included in actual damages when no actual
damages for copyright infringement can be proved.200 In the court’s
view, “as between leaving the victim of the illegal taking with
nothing, and charging the illegal taker with the reasonable cost of
what he took, the latter, at least in some circumstances, is the
preferable solution.”201 Moreover, “[t]o rule that the owner’s loss
of the fair market value of the license fees he might have exacted of
the defendant do not constitute ‘actual damages,’ would mean that
recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the
infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the
infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual
damages. In establishing the infringer’s profits, the copyright owner is
required to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, and the
infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the
elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted
work.
Id.
198

Davis, 246 F.3d at 164. This appears to be the same principle that is
enunciated in Loftsgaarden and there is ample support for this construction of
actual damages in copyright case law. See W ILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT
LAW AND PRACTICE 1167 (1994) (“Within reason, any ambiguities should be
resolved in favor of the copyright owner.”); 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
14.02A, 14–12 (2007) (“Uncertainty will not preclude a recovery of actual
damages if the uncertainty is as to amount, but not as to the fact that actual
damages are attributable to the infringement.”); Fitzgerald Publ’g Co. v. Baylor
Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1118 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[A]ctual damages are
not . . . narrowly focused.”); Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. High Society
Magazine, 778 F.2d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that when courts are
confronted with imprecision in calculating damages, they “should err on the
side of guaranteeing the plaintiff a full recovery”). Cf. In Design v. K-Mart
Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 564 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that any doubts in
calculating profits which result from the infringer’s failure to present adequate
proof of its costs are to be resolved in favor of the copyright holder), abrogated
on other grounds Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
199
246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001).
200
Id. at 164.
201
Id. at 166.

PEARCE FINAL DRAFT A UTHORIZED . DOC

482

12/1/07 7:06 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

in such circumstances an infringer may steal with impunity.”202
Based on that reasoning, the court found that even though the
statute specified actual damages, the “statutory term ‘actual
damages’ is broad enough” to cover this type of recovery. 203
Property law, which has historically applied the disgorgement
principle in cases of intentional fraud,204 is another example of an
expansive interpretation of actual damages. In Dickson v.
Patterson,205 a property fraud case, the Supreme Court held that
the disgorgement of profits obtained from the fraudulent
transaction was the appropriate remedy.206 In Dickson, the
defendant and the plaintiff each bought a half interest in the same
property. 207 The defendant then sold both parties’ property
interests for a modest profit to a third party. 208 The defendant,
unbeknownst to the plaintiff, bought the property back from the
third party at the same price and sold part of it again on his own to
a fourth party for a substantial profit.209 The Court found this to
be impermissible and fashioned a remedy whereby the deeds
executed with fraudulent intent were set aside, leaving the property
in the state it was before the fraud began and, in addition, the
fraudulent party was compelled to disgorge half of the profits he
made from the fraudulent transactions.210 The Court in
Loftsgaarden applied a similar remedy whereby the plaintiff was
able to retain the tax benefits resulting from the investment in the
tax shelter and also receive rescission, thereby returning him to the
position he was in prior to the fraud.211
202

Id.
Id. See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539 (1985) (there the Supreme Court intimated, similarly to the court in
Davis, that royalties would be recoverable under actual damages).
204
Restatement First of Restitution § 151, 202 Cmt. b, c (1937); 4 Scott,
Trusts §§ 507, 508, 508.1 (2d ed. 1956).
205
160 U.S. 584 (1896).
206
Id. at 592.
207
Id. at 586.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 587.
210
Id. at 592.
211
Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 667 (1986).
203
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The Loftsgaarden principle does not stand alone. It is
paralleled in other areas of law and should be applied to
commodities law. Although the statute restricts recovery to “actual
damages,” that term can be interpreted broadly enough to avoid the
injustice and perverse policy that would result from a narrow
interpretation.
E. The Need for a Flexible Interpretation of Actual Damages
Despite the Powers of the CFTC
The CFTC has the power to bring suit in district court against
violators of the CEA.212 In doing so, it can ask for remedies,
including disgorgement of profits,213 monetary penalties214 and a
permanent injunction.215 Given that the CFTC can stop defendants
from profiting from their wrongdoing by bringing suit in district
court, 216 one may wonder why disgorgement or rescission would be
an appropriate remedy under the private right of action for actual
damages.
There are many benefits to allowing a private right of action for
actual damages. First, such private actions add to the efficiency of
the court system.217 Also, this would help ease the burden on the
“overburdened” CFTC reparations program.218 Further, Congress
has indicated that providing for a private right of action and
awarding a successful plaintiff actual damages would provide
immediate relief to commodity investors from fraud.219 The reason
that commodity investors needed this avenue of relief was because
of the shortcomings of the reparations section of the CFTC. 220 The
212

7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (2000); see also Commodities Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
213
Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1382.
214
7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(d)(1).
215
7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a)–(b); Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Muller, 570 F.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (5th Cir. 1978).
216
7 U.S.C. § 13a-1.
217
S. R EP. N O. 97-495, at 51 (1982).
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
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Senate Committee referred to a private right of action as “one
possible solution to the . . . ineffectiveness of the CFTC
reparations program.”221
There are also many advantages to permitting the courts to
interpret actual damages loosely to allow for disgorgement of
profits or rescission in situations where the defendant stands to
profit from his misconduct. Aside from easing the burden on the
CFTC, it would also promote efficiency in the courts; assuming
that private rights of action will be brought prior to CFTC
proceedings, the issue of disgorgement would not need to be
litigated in front of the CFTC because the manipulators will have
already been shorn of all their profits. 222 Fewer litigable issues
would necessarily speed up the trial process and allow for the
resolution of more CFTC initiated claims. Commodities customers
would continue to exercise their rights to initiate proceedings under
the CEA.223 Thus, it is sensible to implement a more flexible
interpretation of actual damages if such a shift can further relieve
the “erratic, overburdened and rarely effective”224 CFTC
reparations program.

221

Id. Allowing the district courts the flexibility of interpreting actual
damages in certain situations to permit disgorgement is not without judicial
support. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296,
1300 (5th Cir. 1978). “In an action to enforce the requirements of a remedial
statute, such as the Commodity Exchange Act (‘the CEA’), a district court ‘has
broad discretion to fashion appropriate relief.’” Commodities Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1379 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (citing
Muller, 570 F.2d at 1300).
222
The assumption that private rights of action would be brought prior to a
CFTC proceeding is reasonable because if a CFTC proceeding predated the
private action, then the likelihood is that the profits will have already been
disgorged and penalties will have been assessed. Thus, there will be nothing left
for the private investor to recover. In addition, it will be presumed that because
of the heavy load of the CFTC, there will be a delay in their bringing actions
against manipulators.
223
7 U.S.C. § 25 (2000).
224
S. R EP. N O. 97-495, at 51.
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V. ACTUAL D AMAGES UNDER THE CEA
This Note suggests two solutions to resolve the problem
presented when, in the context of a private right of action under the
CEA, the defendant stands to benefit from his misconduct because
he profited more than the plaintiff lost. For either solution to be
effective, a flexible interpretation of actual damages is a necessary
predicate.
The first solution is simply using a flexible interpretation of
actual damages that can be applied by the courts based on the
factual circumstances. In the situation explored in this Note, courts
could either afford a remedy of full rescission for situations similar
to that in Loftsgaarden or they could provide for disgorgement of
the defendant’s profits, usually resulting in a windfall to the victim
of the fraud, as has happened in some rule 10b-5 cases. 225
A court, in determining whether to apply a remedy of
rescission or disgorgement, would need guidance as to when and
how to apply such remedies. The courts could look directly to
securities law and in particular the line of cases following
Loftsgaarden to determine the level of proof required to support
either remedy.226 There is ample case law in the securities realm

225

See Lawton v. Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d 428, 442 (D.R.I. 2005); Estate
of Pidcock v. Sunnyland America, 726 F. Supp 1322, 1329 (S.D. Ga. 1989). It
is important to note that a remedy of disgorgement in both securities and
commodities law is the result of an exercise of a district court’s equitable
powers. Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978);
Heffernan, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1379. Thus, simply proving a violation of either
statute would give the court “power to fashion an appropriate remedy.” Sec.
Exch. Comm’n v. Manor Nursing Centers, 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir.
1972).
226
See Pidcock, 726 F. Supp. at 1329 (“In the case of a defrauded seller in
an action brought under Rule 10b-5, ‘where the defrauding purchaser receives
more than the seller’s actual loss, the damages are the purchaser’s profits.’ . . .
Moreover, once the element of fraud has been established, as it was in this case,
‘any profit subsequently realized by the defrauding purchaser should be deemed
the proximate consequence of the fraud.’” [citations omitted]); In re Der, 113
B.R. 218, 231 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989) (citing Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S.
647, 662 (1986)) (supporting a “rescissory” measure of recovery); see also
Siebel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1984); Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d
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that has followed the Loftsgaarden decision and would provide a
useful starting point for courts in determining when to apply either
rescissory or disgorgement damages.227
In the alternative, this Note proposes a second solution. The
profits retained by a defendant beyond what the plaintiff is entitled
to recover could be disgorged and transferred into a fund or trust
under the control of the CFTC for the purpose of offering aid to
the victims of commodities fraud. There is support for a judicially
imposed remedy of this sort.228 Under Rhode Island law, for
example, a constructive trust can be imposed as a remedy for
unjust enrichment.229 Under securities law, a common fund or trust
can be established to benefit all plaintiffs in class actions alleging an
unjust enrichment claim.230 The court, in Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v.
Glauberman, recognized that “disgorgement is a well recognized
device to undo unjust enrichment resulting from illegal securities
trading.”231 The court implied that a constructive trust would be
imposed on money obtained through unjust enrichment.232 It then
presumed that the money in the fund would be put toward the
benefit of the victims of the fraud or in the alternative would go
into the treasury. 233
In fact, Congress established just this sort of fund under
securities law, called Fair Funds, when it enacted the Sarbanesat 442.
227

See generally Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2003); In re
Broderbund/Learning Co. Sec. Litig., 294 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002); DCD
Programs v. Leighton, 90 F.3d 1442 (9th Cir. 1996); McMahan & Co. v.
Wherehouse Entertainment, 65 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995); Anixter v. HomeStake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1549 (10th Cir. 1992); Rousseff v. E.F. Hutton Co.,
843 F.2d 1326 (11th Cir. 1988); Lycan v. Walters, 904 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.
Ind. 1995); Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc. v. Cullather, 678 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.
Va. 1987).
228
Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 434.
229
Id.
230
Everett v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 460 F.3d 818, 824 (6th Cir. 2005);
Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Glauberman, 90 Civ. 5205, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10982, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992).
231
Glauberman, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *3.
232
Id.
233
Id. at *4.
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Oxley Act of 2002.234 The SEC provided for the same fund using
the same language from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in Rule 1100,235
which provides:
In any agency process initiated by an order instituting
proceedings in which the Commission or the hearing officer
issues an order requiring the payment of disgorgement by a
respondent and also assessing a civil money penalty against
that respondent, the Commission or the hearing officer may
order that the amount of the disgorgement and of the civil
money penalty, together with any funds received [by the
Commission] pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 7246(b), be used to
create a fund for the benefit of investors who were harmed
by the violation.236
A similar type of fund could be imposed on the profits of a CEA
violator that go beyond the losses of the plaintiff in an action under
7 U.S.C. § 25. Much like the SEC’s handling of Fair Funds, the
CFTC could then take control of the fund and distribute the
proceeds where needed.
A disgorgement fund, similar to Fair Funds, may not directly
create a greater monetary incentive to bringing suit for victims of
fraud whose losses were small. However, such a fund would likely
give the general public a secure sense that there is justice in the
futures markets and that investors are not just the province of
predators who calculate ways to steal from their prey through
fraud and manipulation. Such a feeling of security and protection
would improve investor confidence and encourage more investors
to enter the market while simultaneously discouraging manipulation
and fraud. Thus, both of the original purposes of the CEA would
be served.237
234

Fair Funds was intended to benefit investors that lost money due to
conduct of individuals or corporations that violated securities laws. It allows the
SEC to combine disgorgement amounts and civil monetary penalties from
securities frauds into one fund to benefit the many victims of these schemes. 15
U.S.C. § 7246(b) (2002).
235
17 CFR § 201.1100 (2006).
236
Id.
237
The purposes of the CEA are: (1) providing for a fair and safe market
place by deterring manipulation and fraudulent behavior and (2) preserving the
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Regardless of the preferred solution, a more flexible
interpretation of actual damages would be a necessary predicate.
Thus, arguments in favor of such a flexible interpretation are
relevant for determining which solution to apply.
CONCLUSION
This Note has set forth two workable solutions available to the
courts. Either solution would address directly the issue of what to
do with a defendant’s profits that exceed the losses of a plaintiff.
Both solutions would avoid the perverse result of the defendant
being able to profit from his wrongdoing. In addition, action by the
district court in these situations should lighten the load on the
CFTC in reparations proceedings. Most importantly, either
solution would be in accord with the previously stated legislative
goals of Congress;238 both solutions would help to deter future
manipulation and would not have an adverse effect on the hedging
function performed by the markets. Either solution would deter
potential violators. Honest investors might even be encouraged to
invest by virtue of the added level of protection they would receive
under the Act. Added deterrence of CEA violations would also
help the government maintain a greater measure of control over
growing futures markets239 without discouraging investors and
honest speculators.
For the reasons already stated, a prudent policy for courts to
follow in regards to the award of actual damages under 7 U.S.C. §
25 is that in situations where the defendant’s profits exceed the
plaintiff’s losses, the court should allow for a measure of recovery
greater than out-of-pocket loss because “[it] is more appropriate to
give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let
the fraudulent party keep them.”240
hedging function of the markets that was deemed essential for the protection of
the actual producers and buyers of commodities. See S. REP. NO. 97-495 at 2
(1982); Campbell, supra note 81, at 223; H.R. REP. N O. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5–6
(1982).
238
H.R. R EP. N O. 421, at 1 (1934).
239
H.R. R EP. 97-565, pt. 2, at 5.
240
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965).

